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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of robust state estimation in
the presence of integrity attacks. There are m sen-
sors monitoring a dynamical process. Subject to the
integrity attacks, p out of m measurements can be arbi-
trarily manipulated. The classical approach such as the
MMSE estimation in the literature may not provide a
reliable estimate under this so-called (p,m)-sparse at-
tack. In this work, we propose a robust estimation
framework where distributed local measurements are
computed first and fused at the estimator based on a
convex optimization problem. We show the sufficient
and necessary conditions for robustness of the proposed
estimator. The sufficient and necessary conditions are
shown to be tight, with a trivial gap. We also present
an upper bound on the damage an attacker can cause
when the sufficient condition is satisfied. Simulation re-
sults are also given to illustrate the effectiveness of the
estimator.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sensor networks have been increasingly applied in var-
ious cyber-physical systems (CPSs) such as smart grid [1]
or Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems [2]. The sensors, however, are vulnerable to in-
tegrity attacks since in most cases they are spatially
distributed and cannot be fully protected. Typically,
the adversary can control a portion of all sensors and
arbitrarily change their measurements during attacks.
The objectives for launching such an attack in indus-
trial systems may include using free electricity in smart
grid, stealing resources like gasoline from oil caverns,
causing economical loss for rivals, etc. Two famous at-
tacks on CPS hampering the critical infrastructure are
Maroochy Water incident [3] and the first SCADA sys-
tem malware (called Stuxnet) [4]. To sum up, Security
in control and estimation systems has received much re-
search attention [5].
In this article, we focus on the problem of robust state
estimation based on compromised sensory data. The
classical approach such as Kalman filtering cannot gen-
erate a reliable estimate in the presence of attacks. To
put it simply, taking all measurements as important,
e.g., (weighted) averaging all the measurements is not
a good idea for robust estimation since one large mea-
surement will drive the final estimate far deviated from
the true value. To be concrete, we consider the problem
of estimating the state x ∈ Rn of a dynamical process
from measurements collected bym homogenous sensors,
where the measurements are subject to Gaussian noise.
Integrity attacks are very likely because the sensors can-
not be fully protected due to practical reasons such as
high maintenance cost. We assume the attacker can
only take control of up to p < m sensors since the re-
sources of attacker may be limited and some sensors are
physically untouchable. We put no restriction on what
the attack is like. In other words, once a sensor is at-
tacked, the sensory data can be arbitrarily manipulated.
Related Work : In the context of power systems, the
estimation based on irregular sensor data has been for-
mulated as bad data detection problem [6,7]. A common
practice is identifying the bad data or outliers by check-
ing the corresponding residue. But this does not work
well for intentional attacks [8–11]. For example, Liu et
al. [8] showed that it is possible to launch a stealthy
attack without being noticed. On the top of that, a
so-called framing attack was studied in [11]. The detec-
tor is very likely to abandon the critical measurement
under the framing attacks. Without the critical mea-
surements, the network is unobservable and a stealthy
attack is possible.
The robust estimator has been long studied in the
field of statistics [12–19]. The robustness is often quan-
tified by breakdown points, e.g., the percentage of bad
sensors, beyond which the estimate is unstable [20, 21].
However, the application of robustness analysis has not
been extended to the estimation problem of a dynamical
system yet.
For dynamical systems, compromised data detection
via fault detection and isolation based methods has been
extensively studied, [22–26]. However, in most of these
works, the system is assumed to be noiseless, which
greatly favors the failure detector. Pajic et al. [27] ex-
tended [25] by taking the bounded system noise into ac-
count. They proved that the worst error is still bounded
for all possible attacks once the sufficient condition for
exact data recovery in noiseless systems is satisfied. The
drawback is that their approach is involved with zero-
norm and thus computationally intractable, especially
for large scale systems. In [28, 29], the authors studied
the worst bias an attack can cause through reachability
analysis and ellipsoid approximation.
The significance of this work is provide a robust es-
timation framework for estimating noisy systems com-
pared with the noiseless case in [25]. To mitigate the
damage injected by the attacker, we propose a robust
estimator based on the convex optimization problem in-
volving L1 regulation which takes an advantage of an-
alytical simplicity over [27]. The proposed estimator is
shown to provide a robust estimate under some suffi-
cient condition. Furthermore, the upper bound of the
gap between the estimate without attacks and that un-
der attacks is also quantified.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we formulate the robust estimation problem. We
study the sufficient and necessary conditions for robust-
ness in Section 3. We analyze the estimation perfor-
mance in Section 4. Simulations are illustrated in Sec-
tion 5. The concluding remarks are given in Section
6.
Notations : The ith entry of the vector u is denoted
as u[i]. The Lp norm of the vector u is denote as ‖u‖p.
If unspecified, ‖u‖ means the L2 norm of u by default.
⌊v⌋ means the largest integer that is less than the scalar
v.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
2.1 System Model
Assume that m homogenous sensors are measuring
the following LTI system (see Fig. 1):
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + w(k). (1)
The measurement equation for the ith sensor is given
by
yi(k) = Cx(k) + εi(k), (2)
Process
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Figure 1: System Block Diagram.
where x(k) ∈ Rn is the state, yi(k) ∈ Rl is the mea-
surement collected by the ith sensor, w(k) ∈ Rn and
v(k) ∈ Rl are the process noise and measurement noise
for the ith sensor, respectively. The noise w(k) and
εi(k)’s are Gaussian distributed, i.e.,
w(k) ∼ N (0, Q), εi(k) ∼ N (0, R).
The noises are assumed to be independent from each
other across different time instants and sensors. Denote
the tall measurement matrix H , [C⊤, C⊤, . . . , C⊤]⊤ ∈
Rlm×n and y(k) , [y1(k)
⊤, y2(k)
⊤, . . . , ym(k)
⊤]⊤.. De-
note Σ = diag(R, . . . , R). The initial state x(0) is Gaus-
sian distributed with mean µ0 and variance P0, and is
independent from all noises. Assume that (A,C) is ob-
servable and (A,Q
1
2 ) is controllable.
Kalman filter is well known as the recursive minimum
mean square error (MMSE) estimator:
xˆKF (k) = (A−K(k)HA)xˆKF (k − 1) +K(k)y(k),
P−(k) = AP (k − 1)A⊤ +Q,
P (k) = (In −K(k)H)P
−(k),
where the Kalman gain is given by
K(k) = P−(k)H⊤(HP−(k)H⊤ +Σ)−1. (3)
The state error covariance P−(k) converges exponen-
tially fast to P which is obtained by solving the follow-
ing discrete algebraic Riccati equation (DARE):
X = AXA⊤ −AXH⊤(HXH⊤ +Σ)−1HXA⊤ +Q.
(4)
Therefore, we assume the Kalman filter to be in the
steady state, i.e., P (k) = (In −KH)P and K(k) = K
from (3).
Due to the homogeneousness of the sensors, we know
that K = [G, . . . , G]⊤ , G ∈ Rn×l. The Kalman filter
can be equivalently rewritten as:
xˆKF (k) =
1
m
∑
i∈S
x˜i(k), (5)
where
x˜i(k) = (A−KHA)x˜i(k − 1) +mGyi(k), (6)
This means the estimation process at the estimator can
be decomposed into m sub-processes each of which only
involves measurements from one sensor. This decom-
position renders distributed estimation possible. To be
specific, the sensor can locally compute x˜i(k) based on
its own measurements and then the information fusion
of all local estimates occurs at the remote estimator. It
is worth noting that such distributed estimation is more
resilient to attacks than the centralized estimation (all
sensors transmit raw measurements). Since each local
estimate of one sensor encodes all its historical measure-
ments, corruption of one local estimate at some time
instant causes little damage to the estimation.
Even if the sensor lacks computational capability and
can only transmit raw measurements, each local estima-
tion process can be computed at the central estimator.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume each
sensor computes a local estimate based on (6) and sends
it to the estimator (see Fig. 1).
2.2 Attack Model
The attacker launches an integrity attack to the sen-
sory data in different fashions. For example, it can
change the physical environment to mislead the sensors
or it hacks the onboard sensor chip or it can manipulate
the data packet during the sensor-to-estimator trans-
mission. No matter in which way the attack is launched,
we have the following equation:
zi(k) = x˜i(k) + ai(k), (7)
where zi(k) ∈ R
n is the “manipulated” local estimate
and ai(k) ∈ Rn is the attack vector. In other words,
the attacker can change the local estimate of the ith
sensor by ai(k). Define the local estimation error as
ei(k) , xk − x˜i(k). Then we have
zi(k) = x(k) + ei(k) + ai(k). (8)
For concise notations, denote
x˜(k) , [x˜1(k)
⊤, x˜2(k)
⊤, . . . , x˜m(k)
⊤]⊤, (9)
z(k) , [z1(k)
⊤, z2(k)
⊤, . . . , zm(k)
⊤]⊤, (10)
e(k) , [e1(k)
⊤, e2(k)
⊤, . . . , em(k)
⊤]⊤, (11)
a(k) , [a1(k)
⊤, a2(k)
⊤, . . . , am(k)
⊤]⊤.
Denote the index set of all sensors as S , {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
For any index set I ⊆ S, define the complement set to
be Ic , S\I. In our attack model, we assume that
the attacker can only compromise at most p sensors but
can arbitrarily choose ai(k). The index set of malicious
sensors is assumed to be time invariant. Formally, a
(p,m)-sparse attack can be defined as
Definition 1 ((p,m)-sparse attack). A vector a
is called a (p,m)-sparse attack if there exists an index
set I ⊂ S, such that:
(i) ‖ai(k)‖ = 0, ∀i ∈ Ic;
(ii) |I| ≤ p.
Define the collection of a possible index set of malicious
sensors as
C , {I : I ⊂ S, |I| = p}.
The set of all possible (p,m)-sparse attacks is denoted
as
A = A(k) ,
⋃
I∈C
{a(k) : ‖ai(k)‖ = 0, i ∈ I
c}, ∀k.
After introducing the (p,m)-sparse attack, we need to
formally define the robustness.
Definition 2 (Robustness). An estimator
g : Rmn 7→ Rn
which maps the measurements z(k) to a state estimate
xˆ(k) is said to be robust to the (p,m)-sparse attack if it
satisfies the following condition:
‖g(x˜(k))− g(x˜(k) + a(k))‖ ≤ µ(x˜(k)), ∀a ∈ A, (12)
where µ : Rmn 7→ R is a real-valued mapping on x˜(k).
The robustness implies that the disturbance on the state
estimate caused by an arbitrary attack is bounded. A
trivial robust estimator is g(y) = 0 which provides a
very poor estimate. Therefore, another desirable prop-
erty for an estimator is translation invariance, which is
defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Translation invariance). An es-
timator g is translation invariant if g(z + Eu) = u +
g(z), ∀u ∈ Rn, where E , [In, . . . , In]⊤.
Remark 1. Notice that if an estimator is robust and
translation invariant, then
‖g(x˜(k))− g(x˜(k) + a(k))‖
= ‖Ex(k) + g(e(k))− Ex(k) + g(e(k) + a(k))‖
= ‖g(e(k)− g(e(k) + a(k))‖ ≤ µ(e(k)).
Therefore, the maximum bias that can be injected by an
adversary is only a function of the noise e(k).
2.3 A Robust Estimator
Apparently, the linear estimator (5) cannot give an
estimate with bounded error even when only one esti-
mate is arbitrarily manipulated. In other words, there
is a conflict between the MMSE optimality and the ro-
bustness against attacks.
The main task of this work is to design a robust es-
timator which achieves a desirable tradeoff between the
MMSE optimality and the robustness, and investigate
the sufficient and necessary conditions to be robust to
(p,m)-sparse attacks. To this end, a general estimator
is proposed as follows:
xˆ(k) , g(z(k)) = arg min
xˆ(k)
∑
i∈S
ϕ(zi(k)− xˆ(k)), (13)
where ϕ : Rn 7→ R. We notice that to recover Kalman
filter we can choose ϕ to be L2 norm. The candidate
functions of ϕ may include Lp norm or LASSO [30], to
just name a few.
Though there are many important estimators as spe-
cial cases of (13), we mainly focus on the properties of
the following concrete estimator in the rest of this pa-
per. The same methodology can be extended to other
ϕ’s. Pajic et al. [27] proposed the following robust esti-
mator in the presence of integrity attack:
minimize
xˆ(k),a,e(k)
∑
i∈S
‖ei(k)‖
2
2
subject to zi(k) = xˆ(k) + ei(k) + ai(k), ∀i,
a ∈ A.
However, the minimization problem involves zero-norm,
and thus is difficult to solve in general. A commonly
adopted approach is to use L1 relaxation to approximate
zero-norm, which leads to the following minimization
problem:
minimize
xˆ(k),a,̟(k)
∑
i∈S
‖̟i(k)‖
2
2 + λ
∑
i∈S
‖ai(k)‖1 (14)
subject to zi(k) = xˆ(k) +̟i(k) + ai(k), ∀i.
If we define the following function F : Rn 7→ R:
F (u) , minimize
v∈Rn
‖u− v‖22 + λ ‖v‖1 , (15)
then one can easily prove that the optimization problem
(14) can be rewritten as
xˆ(k) , g(z(k)) = arg min
xˆ(k)
∑
i∈S
F (zi(k)− xˆ(k)). (16)
In the next section, we shall present sufficient and
necessary conditions for the robustness of the estimator
(16). For concise notation, we will omit the time index
k if it is clear from the context.
3. ROBUST ANALYSIS
We provide an answer to the following question in
this section: in what condition the proposed estimator
in (16) satisfies the robustness requirement (12)?
Before preceding to the main results, we give an ex-
plicit form of F (u) given in (15). We can decompose
F (u) by letting F (u) =
∑n
i=1 f(ui), where ui is the ith
entry of u and f(τ) : R 7→ R is given by
f(τ) , minimize
v∈R
(τ − v)2 + λ |v| , (17)
We define the RHS of (17) as
π(v) , (τ − v)2 + λ |v| .
Applying the KKT conditions, we know that
0 ∈ ∂π(a∗) = −2τ + 2v∗ + sgn(v)λ.
Since π(v) is not differentiable at v = 0, by calculating
the subgradient we have that
v∗ = 0, if |τ | ≤
λ
2
.
For v∗ 6= 0, by letting
0 = −2τ + 2v∗ + sgn(v∗)λ,
we obtain that
v∗ =
{
τ − λ2 , if τ >
λ
2 ,
τ + λ2 , if τ < −
λ
2 .
Therefore, we have f explicitly written as:
f(τ) =
{
τ2, if |τ | ≤ λ2 ,
λ |τ | − λ
2
4 , if |τ | >
λ
2 .
(18)
In the next proposition we present some useful prop-
erties of f and F .
Proposition 1. The properties of f and F are sum-
marized as follows:
(i) f and F are convex.
(ii) f and F are symmetric, i.e., f(u) = f(−u).
(iii) f and F are non-negative and f(0) = 0.
(iv) f and F are twice differentiable.
The results are easy to verify and omitted here.
To obtain the sufficient and necessary conditions for
robustness, we first need to show some findings on the
derivative of F . To facilitate the analysis, we define
two functions. For all u, v ∈ Rn and t ∈ R, define
h : Rn × Rn × R 7→ R as follows:
h(u, v, t) , F (v + tu).
Define the mapping φ : Rn 7→ Rn ,
φ(u) , ∇F (u) = [∇f(u[1]), . . . ,∇f(u[n])]⊤, (19)
where
∇f(u[i]) =
{
2 |u[i]| , if |u[i]| ≤ λ2 ,
sgn(u[i])λ, if |u[i]| > λ2 ,
(20)
where sgn(·) is defined as: if s = sgn(v), then
s[i] =
{
+1, if v[i] ≥ 0,
−1, if v[i] < 0.
Notice that a useful equality in the sequel is
∂h(u, v, t)
∂t
= φ(v + tu)⊤u.
Lemma 1. The following statements are true:
(i) The limit below is well defined for all u ∈ {u ∈
Rn : ‖u‖ <∞}, i.e.,
C(u) , lim
t→∞
∂h(u, 0, t)
∂t
= λ ‖u‖1 , (21)
(ii) The following pointwise limit holds:
lim
t→∞
∂h(u, v, t)
∂t
= C(u). (22)
Moreover, the convergence is uniform on any com-
pact set of (u, v).
(iii) For any u, v, we have that
φ(v + u)⊤u ≤ C(u). (23)
Proof. (i) It is easy to see that
lim
t→∞
∂h(u, 0, t)
∂t
= lim
t→∞
φ(tu)⊤u = λ
n∑
i=1
sgn(u[i])u[i] = λ ‖u‖1 .
(ii) We have that
lim
t→∞
∂h(u, v, t)
∂t
= lim
t→∞
φ(v + tu)⊤u = λ ‖u‖1 .
Due to the convexity of F , ∂h(u, v, t)/∂t is mono-
tonically non-decreasing with respect to t. Fur-
thermore, C(u) is continuous since it is a norm.
Therefore, by Dini’s theorem [31], ∂h(u, v, t)/∂t
converges uniformly to C(u) on a compact set of
(u, v).
(iii) From (19), we know that
φ(v + u)⊤u ≤
n∑
i=1
λu[i] ≤ λ ‖u‖1 .
Therefore, we conclude that φ(v + u)⊤u ≤ C(u)
for any u, v.
Remark 2. Intuitively speaking, one can interpret F
as a potential field and the derivative of F as the force
generated by each sensor. By (23), we know that the
force from the potential field F along the u direction
cannot exceed C(u). On the other hand, Equation (22)
implies that this bound is achievable.
We are now ready to give the sufficient condition for
the robustness of the estimator.
Theorem 1 (Sufficient condition). If the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
2p < m, (24)
then the estimator g is robust.
Proof. Our goal is to prove that there exists a β(x˜),
such that for any t > β(x˜), ‖u‖ = 1, a ∈ A, the following
inequality holds:
∑
i∈S
∂h(−u, zi, t)
∂t
> 0. (25)
As a result, any point ‖xˆ‖ > β(x˜) cannot be the solution
of the optimization problem since there exists ǫ > 0
such that (‖xˆ‖ − ǫ)xˆ/‖xˆ‖ is a better point. Therefore,
we must have ‖g(z)‖ ≤ β(x˜) and hence the estimator is
robust.
To prove (25), we will first look at benign sensors.
We can always find a finite constant Ni depending on
δ and x˜i such that for all t ≥ Ni(δ, x˜i), the following
inequality holds:
∂h(−u, zi, t)
∂t
≥ C(u)− δ = λ− δ, (26)
for any ‖u‖ = 1. We define β(z) , max1≤i≤mNi(δ, zi)
and fix δ to be
δ =
(m− 2p)λ
m
. (27)
Hence, for i = 1, . . . ,m, if t > βδ(z) we know that
∑
i∈Ic
∂h(−u, zi, t)
∂t
≥ (m− p) (λ− δ) , ∀‖u‖ = 1. (28)
We now consider malicious sensors. By Lemma 1 (iii),
we know that for i ∈ I, and any u
φ(zi − tu)
⊤tu = φ(zi − 2tu+ tu)
⊤tu ≤ C(tu)
⇒ φ(zi − tu)
⊤u ≥ −λ.
Then we have∑
i∈I
∂h(−u, zi, t)
∂t
≥ −pλ, ∀‖u‖ = 1. (29)
Hence from (27), (29) and (28), we know that
∑
i∈S
∂h(−u, zi, t)
∂t
≥ (m− p) (λ− δ)− pλ > 0,
which proves (25).
It is shown that if the number of malicious sensors is less
than the good sensors, then the estimator is robust. The
intuition is that the sum force injected by any p sensors
from the potential field F along the u direction must be
able to be balanced by the sum force of the rest m− p
sensors, i.e., zero-sum. Otherwise, the optimal estimate
must lie in the infinity due to unbalanced driving forces
along u and thus violates the robustness defined in (12).
We next present a necessary condition for the robust-
ness of the estimator.
Theorem 2 (Necessary Condition). If the fol-
lowing condition is satisfied:
2p > m,
then the estimator is not robust to the attack.
Proof. The robustness of the estimator is equivalent
to that the optimal estimate xˆ satisfies ‖xˆ‖ ≤ µ(z) for
all a ∈ A, where µ is a real-valued function. To this end,
we will prove that for any r > 0, there exists a y such
that all xˆ that satisfies ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r cannot be the optimal
solution of (16).
We will first look at the compromised sensors. For
every δ > 0 we can always find a finite constant Ni(δ)
such that for any xˆ ∈ {xˆ : ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r} and for all t > Ni,
the following inequality holds:
∂h(u, zi − xˆ, t)
∂t
≥ C(u)− δ (30)
The inequality is due to the uniform convergence of
h(u, v, t) to C(u) on {u} × {v : v = zi − xˆ, ‖x‖ ≤ r}.
Let us choose
δ =
2p−m
m
C(u),
and t = maxi∈I Ni(δ) and zi = tu for all i ∈ I, then we
know for any ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r,
∑
i∈I
∂h(u, zi − xˆ, t)
∂t
≥ pC(u)− pδ.
Now let us look at the benign sensors. By Lemma 1 (iii)
we have
∂h(u, x˜i − xˆ, t)
∂t
≥ −C(u). (31)
From (30) and (31),
∑
i∈S
∂h(u, zi − xˆ, t)
∂t
≥ (m−p)C(u)−pC(u)+pδ > 0
Thus for such a zi satisfying
yi =
{
x˜i, if i ∈ Ic
tu, if i ∈ I,
xˆ+ u is a better estimate than all xˆ satisfying ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r.
Since r is an arbitrary positive real number, we can
conclude that the estimator is not robust.
4. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In the previous section we have studied the robustness
of the estimator. Now we focus our attention on the per-
formance of the proposed estimator. We concern two
questions in this section. The first one is the sufficient
condition that the estimator gives an MMSE estimate
when there is no attack. The other one is what is the
maximum damage that an attacker can cause to the esti-
mate, i.e., the upper bound of ‖g(x˜(k))− g(x˜(k) + a(k))‖.
4.1 Without attacks
When no attacks are present, an MMSE estimate like
a Kalman filter provides is still prefered. Notice that
the proposed robust estimator indeed probabilistically
provides an MMSE estimate. A sufficient condition for
providing the MMSE estimate xˆKF given in (5) is given
as follows.
Lemma 2. If x˜ ∈ G, where
G , {x˜ ∈ Rmn : max
i∈S
‖x˜i − xˆKF ‖1 ≤
λ
2
}, (32)
then xˆ = xˆKF .
Proof. From (32) and (18), we know that xˆLS is a
solution of (16).
Now we characterize the pdf of x˜. Define the local
estimation error covariance of the ith sensor and the
local cross estimation error covariance between the ith
sensor and the jth sensor as
Pii(k) , E[ei(k)ei(k)
⊤|yi(1), . . . , yi(k)],
Pij(k) , E[ei(k)ej(k)
⊤|yi(1), yj(1), . . . , yj(k), yj(k)].
From (6), the error dynamics of the ith sensor estimate
is thus given as follows:
ei(k) = (A−KHA)ei(k − 1)
+ (mGC − In)w(k) +mGεi(k). (33)
Note that the local estimator for each sensor is a stable
estimator since the spectral radius of A −KHA is less
than one [32]. It is easy to see that Pii(k) converges to
P ii at the steady state, where P ii is the unique solution
of the following Lyapunov equation of X :
X = (A−KHA)X(A−KHA)⊤
+ (mGC − In)Q(mGC − In)
⊤ +m2GRG⊤. (34)
Similarly, Pij(k) converges to P ij , where P ij is the
unique solution of the following Lyapunov equation of
X :
X = (A−KHA)X(A−KHA)⊤
+ (mGC − In)Q(mGC − In)
⊤. (35)
Denote Γ = {P ij} ∈ Rnm×nm. Now we know the prob-
ability density function of x˜, i.e.,
x˜ ∼ N (x,Γ),
and thus the distribution of xˆKF . We can compute the
probability of generating the MMSE estimate
Pr (x˜ ∈ G) =
∫
x∈G
N (x,Γ)dx˜. (36)
The integration is not trivial and numerical methods
can be used to approximate Pr (x˜ ∈ G). A closed-form
solution to Pr (x˜ ∈ G) is left as an open question.
Another interesting observation is that the larger λ is,
the more likely the MMSE estimate is.
4.2 Under attacks
We now consider the worst damage that an attacker
can cause, i.e., the maximum deviation between the es-
timate under attacks and that without attacks. If the
necessary condition in Theorem 2 is violated, the esti-
mator is not robust and thus the deviation can be ar-
bitrarily large. A more interesting question is how to
obtain µ(x˜) in (12) for all possible attacks if the estima-
tor is robust.
Suppose the sufficient condition in Theorem 1 is sat-
isfied. Let the robust estimate without attacks to be
xˆR = g(x˜). Due to the translation invariance, we have
‖g(x˜)− g(x˜+ a)‖1
= ‖xˆR − g(x˜+ a)‖1 = ‖g(z − ExˆR)‖1 ≤ µ(x˜).
Denote z˜i , zi− xˆR, z˜ = [z˜1, . . . , z˜m], and x˘i , x˜i− xˆR,
x˘ = [x˘1, . . . , x˘m].
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, there exists β∗
such that for any β ∈ {β : ‖β‖1 > ‖β
∗‖1} the following
inequality holds:
∑
i∈S
φ(z˜i − β)
⊤sgn(β) > 0 (37)
In other words, we want to find a β∗ such that
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈S
∇f (z˜i[j]− β
∗[j]) sgn(β∗[j]) = 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
(38)
where z˜i[j] and β
∗[j] are the jth entry of z˜i and β
∗
respectively.
Define the two mapping κ, κ : Rm × R × R 7→ R for
any vector u and scalars p,m:
κ(u, p,m) ,{
u[i] : |{u[j] : u[j] ≤ u[i], j 6= i}| =
⌊
m− 2p
2
⌋
+ 1
}
,
κ(u, p,m) ,{
u[i] : |{u[j] : u[j] ≥ u[i], j 6= i}| =
⌊
m− 2p
2
⌋
+ 1
}
.
Let ζj , [x˘1[j], . . . , x˘m[j]]
⊤. Then we denote (θi, θi) to
be
(θj , θj) = (κ(ζj , p,m), κ(ζj , p,m)), j = 1, . . . , n. (39)
Now we are ready to present the upper bound on the
worst damage.
Theorem 3. The upper bound µ(x˜) is shown as fol-
lows :
µ(x˜) =
∥∥β+∥∥
1
, (40)
where β+j = max
(∣∣θj − λ/2∣∣ , ∣∣θj + λ/2∣∣) , i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. A sufficient condition for (38) is that for each
j the following inequality holds:∑
i∈S
∇f (z˜i[j]− β[j]) sgn(β
∗[j]) = 0. (41)
We first show that β∗[j] must lie in [θj −λ/2, θj +λ/2].
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose β∗[j] < θj −
λ/2. For any possible Ic, we then have∑
i∈Ic
∇f (x˘i[j]− β[j]) sgn(β
∗[j]) ≥ (m− p)λ.
This is due to the facts that there are at least m − p
points of z˜i[j] are λ/2 larger than β
∗[j] from (39) and
that the maximum gradient is λ from (20).
On the other hand, from Lemma 1 (iii) we know that
for any possible I,∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈I
∇f (z˜i[j]− β[j]) sgn(β
∗[j])
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ pλ.
Hence (41) cannot hold for β∗[j] < θj − λ/2. Similar
arguments applies for β∗[j] > θj + λ/2. Therefore, we
know that β∗[j] ∈ [θj − λ/2, θj + λ/2]. If we take the
maximum over (
∣∣θj − λ/2∣∣ , ∣∣θj + λ/2∣∣) as β+[j], then
any β satisfying ‖β‖ > ‖β+‖ cannot be g(z−ExˆR).
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we illustrate the main results using
numerical examples.
Consider a linear system with
A =
[
0.95 1
0 1.01
]
, Q =
[
1.5 1
1 2
]
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Figure 2: Trajectory of the system state and ro-
bust estimate with different λ. The number of
malicious sensors is 2 out of 5. When p > m/2,
the estimate goes unbounded. The robust esti-
mator with λ = 10 performs worst.
is monitored by m = 5 sensors with
C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, R =
[
2 1
1 1
]
.
First we verify the sufficient and necessary conditions
for robustness. Assume the number of the malicious
sensor is p = 2. In Fig. 2 we depict the trajectory of
the true state and show that the proposed robust esti-
mators give reliable estimates with bounded error. As
comparison, we also plot the case when there are no
attacks in presence in Fig. 3. Still all the estimators
compute reliable estimates. Notice that the estimator
with λ = 10 resembles the Kalman filter most. This
collides with the intuition that a large penalty parame-
ter λ performs poorly in Fig. 2 but works well without
attacks.
In Table. 5 we show the relationship between the
penalty parameter λ and the probability of recovering
Kalman filter when there is no attack. On the other
hand, we plot the upper bound µ(x˜) given in Theorem
3 and the true gap ‖g(x˜)− g(z)‖1 versus time. Notice
that when λ = 1 or λ = 0.1, the upper bound on the de-
viation caused by attacks is smaller. In other words, the
estimator is more robust with a small λ. Tradeoff be-
tween robustness when the sensors are under attack and
the MMSE optimality when the attacker is not present
is clearly shown via different λ’s.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work we have studied the robust state estima-
tion problem in the presence of integrity attacks. The
λ 1 2 5 10
Pr(xˆ = xˆKF ) 0.0001 0.013 0.48 0.98
Table 1: Relationship between the penalty pa-
rameter λ and the probability of recovering
Kalman filter when there is no attack.
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Figure 3: Trajectory of the system state and ro-
bust estimate with different λ without attacks.
The robust estimator with λ = 10 resembles the
Kalman filter most.
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Figure 4: Upper bound µ(x˜) and the true gap
versus time. The number of malicious sensors is
2 out of 5. The robust estimator with λ = 10 has
the largest upper bound and the true gap.
attacker can control p out of m sensors and can arbi-
trarily change the measurement. We have proposed a
robust estimation framework and formulated a convex
optimization problem with L1 regulation to find the ro-
bust estimate. We have also shown the sufficient and
necessary conditions for the estimator is robust against
the (p,m)-sparse attack. Informally speaking, the per-
centage of compromised sensors should be less than a
half to guarantee the robustness. Furthermore, we have
analyzed the estimation performance without attacks
and under attacks. Further work includes the robust
estimation with inhomogeneous sensors.
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